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The twentieth century has witnessed many events which would have
been regarded some fifty years ago as entirely outside the sphere of
possibility. Educated people of the Victorian era used to look forward
with complacency to a steady progress of the world towards freedom
and peace: their sons have seen the whole fabric of political relations
overturned and have fought for bare existence in the most terrible war
in history. The progress of science and education seemed to ensure
a higher level of humanitarian civilization all round: our daily read-
ing nowadays is supplied by tales of massacre, torture, reckless riots,
and class hatred. By the side of all these catastrophes the disputes of
philosophers and jurists may seem very faint and dull, and yet the
tremendous changes in the outlook of the world are reflected in them
in a most characteristic way and give a clue to the fateful revolutions
of European society.
In the domain of jurisprudence the past thirty years have been
marked by ominous unrest. Instead of working out problems of
systematization, construction and application, leading jurists have been
querying and contesting the most fundamental doctrines of the theory
of law. Stammler in Germany,1 Saleilles and Charmont in Francez
have laid stress on the contrast between positive law and right law,
the latter being conceived as a modernised law of nature sitting in
judgment over the injustice and conventionalism of the rules imposed
by the courts. Duguit maintained that it is idle to speak of the State
as the subject of rights and that altogether there is no such thing as
rights in distinction from organized social functions and services.
American teachers of law' insisted on the necessity of establishing the
closest connection between jurisprudence and sociology. Continental
lawyers like Gdny' and Bilow5 traced the barrenness of modem
judicial practice to the slavish respect for forms and logical deductions
1Stammler, Die Lehre von dem richtigen Rechte (I902-07) 2 vols.
'Saleilles, Fondement et dkveloppement du droit (I8g1) 22 Revue internationale
de lenseignement, 39; Charmont, La renaissance du droit naturel (igio).
'Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (igii)
24 HAav. L. REv., 59i (J91I) 25 ibid., 140 (1912) 25 ibid., 489; Wigmore, Nova
Methodus Discendae Docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1917) 30 ibid., 812.
4Giny, Mithod d'interpretation du droit (igoo).
EBilow, Gesetz und Richteramt.
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and demanded a free interpretation and application of juridical rules by
judges attentive to the varied expressions of public opinions and public
needs. I am only mentioning a few examples among many but I
should like to illustrate the aspirations and claims of this reform
movement by considering somewhat more closely one new work of
that kind, Ehrlich's Foundations of a Sociology of Law.6
Professor Ehrlich's book is mainly devoted to the development of
an idea which, although perfectly justified by the facts, is very seldom
recognized by legal theorists, namely the view that the, law applied
by the courts is entirely insufficient to explain the jural relations
current in social intercourse. The law of the courts is a complex of
rules meant to guide the judges in their decisions. But a trial in
court may be considered as an exceptional occurrence in comparison
with the manifold relations and agreements of a juridical nature which
constitute the daily life of the community. As soon as a child is born
a juridical career begins: certain attributes of status, family condition,
property rights, personal rights and duties have been created, and
constitute sometimes a very intricate combination, dependent not only
on the manipulations of solicitors and other professional experts, but
also on the wishes and intentions of the individual concerned and of
other laymen who come into contact with him. In most cases solicitors
will strive to invest the wishes and intentions of their clients with the
requisite complements of legal cautions and forms, but undoubtedly
the management of landed property, of marriage settlements, of trusts
and wills reflects to a large extent the views of ordinary citizens on
the subject, and most of the litigation flowing from such arrangements
remains, as it were, on the surface of professional speculation and
requirements. It is evident that most of the fundamental rules con-
cerning real property or succession have grown out of customary
practices which have been crystallized in daily intercourse quite inde-
pendently of deliberate legislation or of judicial decisions. No legis-
lative or judicial origin can be assigned, for instance, to such rules as
that of coverture or of the curtesy of England, while it is very easy
to see how the preponderance of the husband in the mediaeval house-
hold naturally led to the temporary incapacity of the wife to deal with
her separate property, or how family ties and the continuity of acquired
advantages led to the granting of rights of enjoyment to the surviving
husband on his wife's demise. In the same way, it is to economic
requirements and considerations that we have to look in order to
explain rights of common or regulations as to the use of streams.
The work of the professional lawyer or pleader and the judge generally
begins on the debatable borderland of relations, created by social
intercourse. Does coverture empower the husband to deal so freely
'Ehrlich, Grundlegung einer Soziologie des Rechts (Miinchen und Leipzig,
1913).
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with the estate of the wife as to jeopardize or to destroy the possibility
of resumption? How is the curtesy of England to be adjusted to a
case when a woman has married twice? How are commoners to be
protected against alienations of a common by the lord? How can
the owner of a plot lying up-stream be prevented from damaging the
interests of settlers whose farms lie down-stream?
What is more, it is most important to realize that the influence of
non-litigious arrangements on law is by no means restricted to early
stages of development. It may be observed any day in the most
varied directions in our own time.
"In the chapter of the Austrian Civil Code which deals with marriage
contracts there are four small paragraphs, which according to the
marginal title are concerned with community of property. Anyone
who has occasion to come in contact with the Austro-German peasants
knows that they live almost without exception under the regime of
community of conjugal property. But this community of conjugal
property which is the prevailing and agreed condition in regard to
property among the Austro-German peasantry, has nothing to do with
that dealt with in the Austrian Civil Code, and the enactments of the
latter do not apply to it, since they are always superseded by marriage
contracts in the usual form."
7
"Or again take agricultural leases. The few enactments which
modem codes, especially the Austrian and German civil codes, contain
on that subject are for the most part taken from Roman law, originate
in the exhausted soil of Italy in the period of the Roman Empire,
with its thoroughly intensive system of cultivation usual on the
latifundia and the depressed condition of its farmers. They would
be completely inadequate nowadays. A glance at the facts shows that
they scarcely apply at all; they are almost entirely deprived of validity
and the clauses of the leases are substituted for them, as they are
agreed upon between lessor and lessee in accordance with the present
state of development of our rural husbandry, and with modem social
and economic conditions. They vary according to the locality, the
kind of property farmed, the status of the parties, but still they follow
in spite of these limitations certain typical and ever-recurring contents.
It is therefore quite clear that a presentation, however exact, of the
law of leases given in the civil codes could not furnish a true picture
of the law of leases actually practiced in Germany and Austria."8
"The only branch of the law in which the theory is not only occa-
sionally but always based on actual practice is commercial law. In
this case trade-custom and usage have been recognized officially by
jurisprudence. The organization of the great estate and of the factory,
even of the bank, is a sealed book to the modem jurist, but that of the
commercial house is known to him at least in outline from the com-
mercial code."9
All these facts are derived, according to Ehrlich, from one funda-
mental principle: law as a complex of rules of conduct depends
T Ibid., 396. 8 Ibid., 397.
' Ibid., 398.
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primarily on the common-sense relations between members of social
unions of various kinds: families, farms, workshop organizations,
factories, trade associations, etc. Law is therefore in truth the settled
form of social order and deals with institutions rather than with rules.
Our author tabulates the social facts which serve as basis for legal
rifles under four heads: practice, domination, possession, and agree-
ment. In each of these species legal doctrines arise and rules are
formulated, but their rbots are discernible in business intercourse.
"Even in so highly developed a political system as that of the
Roman Commonwealth or of Great Britain the constitutional position
of the different parts of the State depends mainly on practice"1
"The ordering and regulating power of practice in associations
depends on the fact that it gives expression to the balance of forces
within the associations."'
1
"The only association the regulation of which even at the present
time depends chiefly on practice is the house community of the family,
not merely as a moral and social, but as an economic association. It
is an association for production and consumption in the country, purely
for consumption in towns, almost exclusively for housing purposes
among a certain class of workers.'
2
The notion of domination is taken in a very wide sense and covers
all situations in which submission to, orders is a necessary feature.
Such relations are especially common in ancient society but they occur
also in modern times.
"On the economic productivity of labor is based the question of
personal subjection; it becomes a part of the legal system because
the labor of the subordinate is of paramount importance for the
economic organization of society at large. The unfree man may be
a servant in a peasant household, or a footman at a royal court; he
may with thousands of his fellow-men work on a plantation or in a
mine; he may live in a cottage with wife and children, as a rent paying
farmer on the estate of his lord and make his living as a serf on his
own account from the land leased to him on moderate conditions; he
may be a teacher, a steward, or a riding-sergeant in his lord's service,
or carry on independently a business or trade in the town. Whether
he is one or another of these depends not on the caprice of the lord,
but on the whole economic condition of the country.""
As regards possession the famous controversy about its relation to
property may be explained by the peculiar situation of the ager
privatus in ancient Rome, which gave rise to the abstract doctrine of
dominium. From a wider point of view
"possession is the power of effective disposal over ...goods, and






Whether this is the case is a question of actual experience and the
answer varies in accordance with the difference as to the objects
of possession, as to the power of possessors, as to the conditions of
public security, public morals, and economic development.""
"Possession is a fact of law in the sense that it is the possessor who
uses and gets the value from things conformably to their economic
purpose. In the economic use of things the possessor is protected
in all systems of law. It makes no difference whether the protection
is effected as in Roman law by means of special legal remedies, or as
in English law by private actions in trespass, or again as in Scandinavia
mainly by criminal jurisdiction."1 5
As regards agreements the characterictic feature of Ehrlich's teach-
ing is the stress laid on informal agreements destitute of coercive
force (pacta) and on the "natural obligations" resulting from them.
"It must be pointed out emphatically that for economic life we
depend above all on obligation and not on responsibility, and that in
the great majority of cases it is almost immaterial whether a contract
is actionable or not, . ..provided that one can count upon its ful-
filment according to the rules of business intercourse."' 6
"A large part of stock exchange business has been carried on now
for at least a century with considerable security outside the limits
of the actionable and even of what is legally permissible. It is
especially in connection with social struggles and the economic
movement that a number of non-actionable agreements have been
concluded; many trusts of employers, many wage agreements of
workers, as well as most agreements about prices, could not be
enforced in a court of law."' 7
The prevailing method of legal reasoning and study, which starts
from a supposed transformation of energy on the part of a central
motive power, the State, is thoroughly inadequate. True, the modem
State has indeed, on the strength of sc')ereignty, assumed the part of
universal legislator and judge, but far from being omnipotent it is
as little able to direct and command the conduct of the society included
in it as King Canute was able to rule over the tide. Ehrlich notes
that the fiction of the omnipotence of the State is giving way of
late. The doctrine represented by old jurisprudence so well known
in England and the United States from the works of Austin and of
his followeri-can hardly be maintained in view of the staggering
advance of new social formations, for instance, of the labor unions,
which began as illegal combinations, almost conspiracies, and have
grown to be one of the most powerful factors in the social arrange-
ments of the present day. The old theory of State and law bears the
mark of its origin in periods when society was tending principally
towards unification and simplification, was fighting privileges and
factious groups, and therefore sacrificed all other considerations to
Randa, Der Besitz (Leipzig, 1879). " Ibid., 88.
"Ibid., 76. - Ibid., 88.
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that of the rule of State law. The reaction against such uniformity
and against the pulverization of society into a congeries of isolated
individuals transacting business by the sole help of free contract and
"cash nexus" is certainly very noticeable in our days, and Professor
Ehrlich's book may serve as an interesting expression of this tendency.
Curiously enough this social bent of our author has led him back
to a seemingly antiquated school, to the "Historical School of law"
which flourished on the continent of Europe in the first half of the
nineteenth century. Professor Ehrlich is bold enough to maintain
that jurisprudence has deteriorated since the days of Savigny, Puchta,
and Beseler. His remarks on the subject are wor:th quoting.
"The respective relations of these kinds of law can be shown best
by quoting from a note book of Savigny's lectures delivered in 1819.
'Thus law can be formulated on scientific lines first by scientifically
trained jurists and then through legislation. To fix in this way the
essential invisible spirit of national law ought to be the single aim
of legislation. Unfortunately many legislators have not acted in this
spirit, and so law in its essence has suffered much harm. . . . In
the latter case the written sources are not according to our view the
origin, but only the signs and tokens of law, from which we infer
backwards to underlying rights.' "Is
"Savigny's principal follower, Puchta, develops this view further.
'The theory of law which existed before the coming in of the so-called
Historical School entirely cut off the State from its natural basis,
the nation, and turned it into a purely arbitrary and mechanical estab-
lishment. Law was derived solely from the action of legislative power,
and insomuch as other forces had to be recognised as creating right,
they were considered as a direct Eindirect] product of legisla-
'tion. . . . The Historical School took another road; it went back to
the concept of the National, and found in the latter the natural basis
of Law and of the State.'"-
Ehrlich wants to build on the foundations laid down by these
teachers: he characterizes the most famous representatives of modern
German jurisprudence, Windscheid, Brinz, even Ihering in his first
period, as "mathematicians" busy with symbols, but devoid of the
sentiment of reality, and leading juridical thought into a labyrinth
of abstractions. He makes an exception for Gierke, as a student of
the "Genossenschaft" and a militant Germanist, representing the tra-
dition of the Historical School of law, but he seeks inspiration mainly
in the works of the early spokesmen of the school; while Ihering, even
the Ihering of the second period, hardly plays any part in our author's
presentation. It is not less characteristic of Ehrlich's standpoint that
he ridicules in a few lines the achievements of "ethnological" juris-
prudence on the ground- that it is no use seeking to explain difficulties
Ehrlich, op. cii., 360. Ibid., 361.
22
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by turning to distant times, even less amenable to observation and
explanation than our own epoch.
We may start with this point in our critical remarks on Ehrlich's
work. It is almost inconceivable how an author who rightly describes
the conception of evolution as the basis of our outlook on life, who
constantly refers to the state of law in early communities, could have
treated ethnological and, for that matter, anthropological investigations
in such a superficial manner! What is the use of talking in a
vague manner of the "Sippe" or of the "Giitergetneinschaft" of
husband and wife among the peasantry, if the immense and invaluable
materials supplied by the life of tribes whom we can observe with our
own eyes and by the folklore of societies in various stages of develop-
ment are neglected or confused? Professor Ehrlich should turn to
Frazer's volume2" or make a real study of his countryman Ficker's2 1
exceedingly tangled but suggestive studies on the development of
systems of succession and of married women's property "rights."
This would help him to form a competent opinion on these matters.
It is not a, question of substituting what is more obscure for what is
less obscure, but the task of obtaining a broad social background for
any generalization on inheritance, land tenure, marriage, status of
dependent populations, etc., that induces us to study primitive insti-
tutions and Professor Ehrlich himself is driven on every page of his
book to make surmises as to the social antecedents of modern rules
of law. This being so, it is no use pretending that exact results can
be obtained in this direction without exact study. Other jurists-
Jellinelk and Maitland-have protested against certain exaggerations
of the ethhological method, but their hostility was the product either
of an analytical treatment of juridical subjects, of which Professor
Ehrlich emphatically disapproves, or of a critical examination of the
facts from a point of view derived from common law and not wholly
applicable to folklore.
The strange treatment of Ihering's doctrines in the book under
discussion is also very significant. Ihering started as an adept of the
Historical School and, in so far, the reproach addressed to him as
a "mathematician" is hardly justified. In fact Ihering, though a
great master of dialectic analysis, was as averse to logical exercises in
"abstractions" as Professor Ehrlich himself, but in his second period,
he came to realize clearly the main defect of the Historical School-
its inability to do justice to conscious, creative effort, gnd the great
work of his closing years22 shows how keenly he felt the necessity of a
social background for any generalization on the growth and the aims
"Frazer, Totemism and Exogamy (London, 19IO) 4 vb1s.; Frazer, Folklore
of the Old Testament (London, 1918) 3 vols.
' Ficker, Studien zur Erbenfolge in den germanischen Rechten (89i-xgo4)
6 vols.
' Ihering, Zweck im Recht,
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of law. The reproach of having disregarded the moral and cultural
forces which surround and support legal rules in social intercourse
can certainly not be directed against the .author of the "Zweck im
Recht." I can explain Ehrlich's aloofness only by his wish to steer
clear as far as possible from the history of legal systems and to con-
centrate on the study of their social surroundings; indeed the accent
always falls on the latter in his chapters. But that points to an
important limitation of our author's range of view and of reasoning.
However much we recognize the necessity of connecting legal rules
with the social phenomena which it is intended to regulate by means
of them, these legal rules form mighty structures of their own, co-
ordinated and balanced by the necessity to settle conflicting claims.
These claims arise out of the interests and energies of the various
individuals and communities held together by the State, and the balance
is adjusted and maintained by the State and its courts. In exercising
their functions of umpires and authorities the judges have to guide
themselves not only by their general views as to the practical, the
useful, and the just, but by propositions of law, which like all other
human propositions are under the control of logic. It is this twofold
character of legal thought that makes it particularly difficult and
particularly important to estimate at its right value; and one feels
almost tempted to address to Professor Ehrlich in this respect the
warning of a German saying: "Man muss nicht das Kind init dem
Bade ausschiitten."
23
In fact it seems that the propagandists of a reformed jurisprudence,
as represented by Professor Ehrlich, are much more at home in the
field of legal doctrine than in that of the "sociology" they are appealing
to for rescue from juridical pedantry. "Sociology" is yet too indefinite
and too incomplete to serve as a scientific basis to law. The best
among its promoters, men like Durkheim, like Jellinek, were very well
aware that the general theory of the subject excelled rather in
nomenclature and commonplaces than in substantial results. Their
work stands for the scientific study of society, not yet for the prema-
ture generalization of these studies. Ehrlich's endeavors are at bottom
directed towards the same aim: Therefore his book had better be
called "Studies on the Social Conditions of Law" not "Foundations
of a Sociology of Law." Notice that it does not stand in any relation
to the best known systems of sociology-to Comte, to Spencer, to
Giddings, to Simmel.
When this has been admitted, it is not difficult to perceive that the
author has neglected one of the principal methods of such a study,
namely the historical one. Chance excursions and vague allusions to
"early times" and ancient formations like the Kindred (Sippe) or
Slavery do not make up for the absence of a genuine investigation of
" Don't throw the child out together with its bath.
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historical development. The only point on which something like a
study of juridical evolution can be traced is the part dealing with the
Reception of Roman law. Though far from complete, it presents an
interesting survey and contains many valuable remarks on the work
of the glossators and commentators. This side of the inquiry is so
material for the arguments and conclusions of the writer that it
might be worth while to point out one or two particular points con-
nected with it.
An attentive reader of the book under discussion will be puzzled
on almost every page by the sudden transitions from the Rome of the
Twelve Tables to nineteenth century England or to seventeenth century
Germany. It is hardly too much to ask that comparisons and gener-
alizations should take into account the relative setting of the various
phenomena within certain types of legal and social formation. The
conception of the family is not the same in the midst of a tribal
group, of a Greek w6)us, of the mediaeval world regulated by canon
and feudal law, of the individualistic society of modem times. Nor
does any other juridical formation remain identical within varying
social types. Now Ehrlich's "Foundations of a Sociology of Law,"
though bristling with allusions to these shifting surroundings, does
not make any attempt at settling the conditions of the historical per-
spective through which these types have passed, nor does it seem to
realize that such a perspective is absolutely necessary from a critical
point of view.
I should not like, however, to conclude on a note of discord. The
book with all its shortcomings is a most valuable contribution to the
theory of jurisprudence. It is full of suggestive ideas and of brilliant
observations. And the direction of its effort, the onslaught on the
barren symbolism of legal mathematicians, is thoroughly justified in
the present state of jurisprudence.
